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Introduction
How, as a matter of law and policy, should mitigation measures be taken into account in determining
whether a project will have significant environmental effects and therefore be subject to assessment under
the EUEnvironmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) Directive?1 The issue is important regardless of whether
we see impact assessment as about generating better information for decision-makers, or about changing
decision-making cultures.2 If EIA is a purely procedural mechanism, the decision on whether to require
assessment—the screening decision—is where EIAmay have a obviously substantive edge. Projects above
the significance threshold must be assessed but in principle may be consented regardless of significant
adverse effects; projects taken beneath the screening threshold via mitigation should, in principle, not
have significant environmental effects. If, then, EIA can prevent significant adverse environmental effects,
is this not a positive outcome? On the other hand, should EIA not give a broad range of stakeholders,
including the public, the chance rigorously to test the claims made for mitigation measures?
It is unsurprising that views differ on this issue. Conceptually—perhaps even metaphysically—it is
problematic to distinguish clearly between an activity and the measures proposed to minimise or mitigate
for the adverse consequences of the activity: no one would seriously assess the environmental impact of
a car without also, e.g. considering the working of its exhaust system. Neatly distinguishing a project and
its mitigation, then, may not be straightforward. It might also be somewhat unreal to consider the
significance of the effects of a project without also considering those measures which are likely to be put
in place to regulate that effect, such as environmental permissions, especially if these are uncontroversial
and likely to be effective.
For such a central issue in impact assessment, and one which is very much a “live” practical issue, its
visibility is low. Although the issue has come before courts in the United Kingdom on a number of
occasions over the last decade, it has yet to be interrogated by the Court of Justice of the European Union
and mitigation issues receive almost no attention in the EU academic literature. Whether this is because
*Kent Law School (d.mcgillivray@kent.ac.uk). Thanks to Richard Buxton, Jane Holder, Bill Howarth, Daniel Mandelker, Mike Purdue and the
participants at the SLS Environmental Law Subject Section meeting, LSE, September 2008, for comments and discussion on a draft. Particular thanks
to Paul Stookes for comments and case law updates and for keeping my faith that this issue matters. The usual disclaimers apply.
1Council Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175/40 as amended
(“the EIA Directive”).
2 J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision-Making (OUP, 2004) 23–29. A broad spectrum of approaches is considered in
R. Bartlett and P. Kurian, “The Theory of Environmental Impact Assessment: Implicit Models of Policy Making” (1999) 27(4) Policy & Politics 415.
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the matter is not seen as central,3 or is seen as simply a matter of judgment,4 or the issue is being fudged,
is unclear. With the European Commission currently considering revisions to the EIADirective,5 a detailed
examination of the issue is timely.
Structure, method and scope
I begin by exploring the issue in the context of the EU EIA Directive, analysing the Directive and
considering the limited empirical literature on screening practice. I move on to examine UK case law,
which I argue shows shifts in approaches over time to this issue, with the current position showing signs
of uncertainty and unease about the correct approach to be taken. I then compare experience in the United
States under the National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (“NEPA”), where the need for full assessment
of federal actions may be bypassed by a “mitigated finding of no significant impact” or “mitigated FONSI”.
I point to EU and US literature commending the way in which the threat of the full impact assessment
procedure seems to generate mitigation measures to take projects beneath the relevant thresholds. This
“penalty default” or self-regulatory function should not be lightly dismissed.
The comparison between the EIA Directive regime and NEPA is somewhat inexact. The former tends
to be more focused on the practice of private developers who provide the bulk of the environmental
information, whereas the latter is more about public agency practice. Also, the mitigated FONSI avoids
the obligation to produce the very onerous environmental impact statement, but can remain a significant
obligation in its own right. At least under UK law, what is bypassed is on the whole a probably less
burdensome process overall, and if no assessment is required then the burden, although not insignificant,
is probably likely to be somewhat less onerous than in undertaking a mitigated FONSI. Moreover, unlike
the EU EIADirective which requires assessment if a project is of a kind listed in Annex I, but only requires
projects of a kind listed in Annex II to be assessed if they are likely to give rise to significant environmental
effects,6 NEPA does not distinguish mandatory and “discretionary” assessment.
Understanding differences such as these is important background to evaluating the different regimes,
and also helps in understanding the academic literature on ways to address mitigation and assessment
bypassing and problems of prediction in assessment screening. I consider proposals which place more
emphasis on following through on negative screening decisions to check whether significant effects have
in fact arisen, and look in particular at Karkkainen’s suggestion that more adaptive or contingent modes
of screening could be explored, some of which are already found in US legislation. These draw, in part,
on theories of adaptive management and of regulatory experimentalism, which in turn draw from
epistemological pragmatism.7
I then return to the EU EIA Directive and considers how the lessons learnt from the preceding analysis
might be taken on board to reshape EU law or to guide decision-makers and the courts. I argue that this
divides between approaches which stress changes to the way in which screening is conducted and reviewed,
and which engage issues of the proper standard of review of screening decisions, and approaches which
in defined instances involve follow-through measures.
3 In the context of ecological harm see J. Treweek, Ecological Impact Assessment (Blackwell, 1999) 219 (“the deliberate avoidance of ecological
impact through objective consideration of ecological constraints at the design stage appears to be relatively unusual”). This may no longer be the case
to such a degree.
4 “I think there is a real risk of over-complicating what in essence is a relatively straightforward matter,” Laws L.J. in R. (on the application of
Dicken) v Aylesbury Vale DC [2007] EWCA Civ 851 at [17].
5Commission (EU), Public consultation on the Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive (Council Directive 85/337 on the
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175/40 (“the EIA Directive”)) at http://ec.europa.eu
/environment/consultations/eia.htm [Accessed September 24, 2011].
6EIA Directive art.2(1) and 4(2).
7For a fine analysis see B. Norton, Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management (University of Chicago Press 2004), especially
Ch.3.
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In conclusion I argue that, whilst recognising the regulatory attractions of taking mitigation into account
in screening for assessment, there is currently an unnecessarily and undesirably narrow approach currently
taken under the EIA Directive. With amendment to the Directive there is scope to improve upon this.
Short of this, a heightened standard of review of “significance”, and within this of the scope for mitigation
measures to bring projects beneath the significance threshold, may also be desirable.
A note about scope: in this article I focus on impact assessment under the general regimes provided for
under the EUEIADirective and under NEPA. I do not consider in any detail, in the EU context, “appropriate
assessment” under the EU Habitats Directive, a requirement which is part of a more general regime to
ensure that plans or projects that are potentially damaging to protected conservation areas are assessed so
that the conservation objectives of the site can be achieved.8 This is because appropriate assessment raises
certain specific issues, in particular the substantive conservation objectives which are being pursued, as
opposed to more inherently procedural impact assessment regimes. Reasons of space prevent these being
explored here9, as they do the distinct but related EU regime governing strategic environmental assessment
of plans and programmes.10
Mitigation and the EU EIA Directive
Under the EU EIA Directive, screening to determine whether impact assessment is required of an Annex
II project may be either on a case-by-case basis or via the use of exclusive or indicative thresholds. Three
factors need to be formally considered: the characteristics and location of the project, and the characteristics
of the impact. Mitigation measures are not mentioned in terms of defining the characteristics of the project
or of its impact.11 However, the environmental information provided by the developer must describe any
remedial and mitigation measures.12 And the 1997 amendment to the Directive explicitly requires that,
when a decision to grant or refuse development consent has been taken, this decision must be publicised
and must include “a description, where necessary, of the main measures to avoid, reduce and, if possible,
offset the major adverse effects”.13
Putting these together might suggest that developers cannot escape the need for EIA via mitigation,
since mitigating measures could only be a secondary issue. It might also be argued that allowing proposed
mitigation measures to be considered in determining significance amounts to something similar to the use
of overly lenient screening thresholds, which the Court of Justice has condemned14 and hence as frustrating
the “wide scope and broad purpose” of the Directive.15
On the other hand, the trigger for EIA is whether the project will give rise to significant environmental
effects, and if this point is not reached it can be argued that there is no obligation to assess. As a main aim
of EIA should be to prevent environmental harm,16 and if this can be designed out before the project is
submitted for approval, then EIA can be said to have done its job.
8Council Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L206/7 (“the Habitats Directive”) especially
art.6(3).
9For some thoughts see D.McGillivray, "Mitigation, Compensation and Conservation: Screening for Appropriate Assessment under the EUHabitats
Directive", Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law, forthcoming.
10Directive 2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L197/30.
11EIA Directive art.4(3) and Annex III.
12EIA Directive art.5(1) and Annex IV para.5 (“A description of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and where possible offset any significant
adverse effects on the environment”). Article 5(3), which fleshes out those things that about which information must be provided (and which in part
duplicates Annex IV) refers to including “a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse
effects”. The reason for the difference in terminology is unclear.
13EIA Directive art.9(1).
14Commission v Belgium (C-133/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-2323; Aanemersbedriff P K Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland (C-72/95)
[1997] All E.R. (EC) 134; [1996] E.C.R. I-5403;World Wildlife Fund (WWF) v Autonome Provinz Bozen (C-435/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-5613; [2000] 1
C.M.L.R. 149.
15Aanemersbedriff P K Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland (C-72/95) [1997] All E.R. (EC) 134; [1996] E.C.R. I-5403.
16 “… the best environmental policy consists in preventing the creation of pollution or nuisances at source, rather than subsequently trying to
counteract their effects” Recital 1, Preamble, EIA Directive. See also the discussion below.
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In this connection the European Commission’s 2001 Screening Guidance on EIA specifies that in terms
of the characteristics of the project “information about mitigating measures being considered” and, in
terms of characteristics of the potential impact, “mitigation incorporated into the project design to reduce,
avoid or offset significant adverse impacts” are relevant factors in screening to determine whether
assessment is required.17 The Guidance advises more generally that if it will be “difficult to avoid, or
reduce or repair or compensate for the effect” this will tend towards the need for assessment.18
Yet the absence of a full environmental impact assessment restricts opportunity for public participation.
Under the EIA Directive there has never been a legal requirement for public participation when projects
are initially screened,19 and it is notable that this remains the case notwithstanding revisions to the Directive
to give effect to the Aarhus Convention.20 In its 2003 review of the Directive, the Commission found that
only three Member States (Italy, Spain and Sweden) consulted the public before arriving at a screening
decision on Annex II projects.21 One notable development is that a duty to give reasons for negative
screening decisions has been recognised by the European Court of Justice,22 and this ought to feed back
into more robust decision-making. However, it remains the case, at least in the United Kingdom, that
while project proponents may appeal an adverse screening decision, in the absence of third party appeal
rights “objectors” must resort to the courts via judicial review. I return to this particular issue below.
17European Commission, Guidance on EIA: Screening (2001) B4.
18European Commission, Guidance on EIA: Screening (2001) B4.
19This is hinted at in the latest European Commission review of the Directive, see Commission (EU) Report from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the application and effectiveness of
the EIA Directive (Directive 85/337 (“the EIA Directive”), as amended by Directives 97/11 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L73/5 and 2003/35 providing for public participation in respect of the
drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council
Directives 85/337 and 96/61 [2003] OJ L156/17) COM (2009) 378 para.3.3.
20Directive 2003/35 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment
and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337 and 96/61 [2003] OJ L156/17. See in particular EIA
Directive art.6(4), referring to early participation in the assessment process but not screening.
21“One reason given for including public participation during screening is that the measure of what constitutes a significant effect is largely subjective
and its determination should include those that will be affected by the project. Some of the Member States publicise the fact that a screening decision
is to be made and the public have an opportunity to comment. In other Member States the screening decision is seen as a wholly technical process
where the public are either ‘represented’ by public bodies or are given the opportunity to appeal against a decision through the courts. … [and] in some
cases the domestic legislation makes EIA for most Annex II projects mandatory and so there is no screening decision on which the public can be
consulted”, Commission “Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, On the Application and Effectiveness of the EIA
Directive: How successful are the Member States in implementing the EIA Directive?” COM (2003) 334 final 3.2.22.
22R. (on the application of Mellor) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (C-75/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-3799; [2010] Env. L.R.
2 held that such reasons were required if asked for by an interested party (giving effect to the Aarhus Convention). In England and Wales, at least, it
is currently proposed to extend this duty to any negative screening decision.
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Screening practice and pressures
In the European Union, there are no figures for the extent to which projects which would otherwise require
assessment are not assessed because of the consideration given to mitigation measures.23 It is also worth
noting that the early literature on screening tended to focus on the adequacy of screening decisions,
identifying the extent to which projects which might have required EIA went un-assessed,24 while more
recently there has been greater emphasis on the range of factors which influence screening decisions.25
Specific research by Nielson and others on a sample of 98 screening decisions in Denmark found that
the screening process results in a significant proportion of projects being altered both before submission
and during screening. Ultimately full EIA was required for only three per cent of screened projects.
Developers and their consultants were the primary moving forces in seeking to avoid assessment, though
decision-makers also have an interest in avoiding the costs involved, with the process characterised as a
negotiated one conducted in the shadow of the perceived cost and delay associated with full assessment.26
For Nielson and others, screening is “more than an EIA-filtering requirement” but a modern instrument
encouraging dialogue between developers and their consultants (and in some cases decision-makers),
proactiveness and self-regulation. They do note, however, concerns about the extent of consideration of
environmental impacts and the lack of public accountability. They note that dialogue is “kept on track”
by the “powerful threat” of the full assessment process.27 Whether this means that mitigation beyond that
which would be likely to be required at the end of a full assessment process can be extracted from developers
as the price of avoiding assessment is unclear.
If screening does perform the function of significantly bypassing the need for full assessment, however,
there may be factors at work which undermine this function in practice. Cost, time and delay factors
influence developers and decision-makers not just in their wish to bypass assessment but also in the rigour
with which the screening process is likely to be undertaken.28 Hence, while taking mitigation into account
via screening might produce seemingly beneficial outcomes, there is a danger of taking too rosy-eyed a
view of this and of not being sensitive to the wider administrative context within which such decisions
are made.
23Commission (EU) Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive (Directive 85/337 (“the EIA Directive”), as amended by Directives
97/11 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L73/5 and
2003/35 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending
with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337 and 96/61 [2003] OJ L156/17) COM (2009) 378 3.2.14 (“Little
evidence has been provided on how the screening systems put in place have been operating in practice at competent authority level”). There are isolated
pockets of information. At least before 2006 no environmental statement was ever required in the UK for projects for the use of uncultivated land or
semi-natural areas, because negotiation during screening always identified ways to bring the proposed project below significance, S. Bell and D.
McGillivray, Environmental Law, 7th edn (OUP, 2008) 748. In other jurisdictions the number of EIAs for livestock projects following screening is
close to zero, see J. Weston, “Implementing International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Wadden Sea” (2007) 15(1) European Planning
Studies 133 and L. Kørnøv and P. Christensen “Changes in Livestock Projects on the Basis of Environmental Impact Screening” (2009) 11(2) J. of
Envtl. Assessment Policy & Management 175.
24 See, e.g. Department of the Environment,Monitoring Environmental Assessment and Planning (London: HMSO, 1991).
25 J. Weston, “EIA, Decision-making Theory and Screening and Scoping in UK Practice” (2000) 43(2) J. of Envtl Planning & Management 185,
195 (finding that inexperienced officers tended, in relative terms, not to require full assessment), but see now the more comprehensive study in G.
Wood and J. Becker, Screening Decision-Making Under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales)
Regulations 1999 (Oxford Brookes University, 2003) at www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/planning/iau/screening.pdf [Accessed September 24, 2011]
(finding that inexperienced officers required EIA the most).
26E. H. Nielson, P. Christensen and L. Kørnøv, “EIA Screening in Denmark: A New Regulatory Instrument” (2005) 7(1) J. of Envtl Assessment
Policy & Management 35. Of the 98 projects screened, 55 related to livestock and the remainder spanned the rest of Annex II.
27E. H. Nielson, P. Christensen and L. Kørnøv, “EIA Screening in Denmark: A New Regulatory Instrument” (2005) 7(1) J. of Envtl Assessment
Policy & Management 35.
28Other factors also play a part, including a degree of caution that decisions will subsequently be overturned if assessment is not required, a change
in attitude ascribed to the influence of the courts, see J. Weston, “EIA, Decision-making Theory and Screening and Scoping in UK Practice” (2000)
43(2) J. of Envtl Planning & Management 185, 195.
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UK case law on bypassing EIA through mitigation
In the absence of any directly-relevant Court of Justice of the EU case law, this section considers the
approach of the UK courts in this field. I argue that this case law can be divided into three phases. There
is no neat demarcation between these, but the distinction serves the purpose of showing in broad terms
the approach of the courts to the issue and in particular the tension between the competing values of, on
the one hand, the practical desirability of mitigation measures being engaged with before deciding whether
to assess, and the consequences of the lack of full assessment of these measures in terms of the values of
public participation and rigorous decision-making. I also indicate how trends in EU administrative law
may have a bearing.
I argue that the case law shows continuing uncertainty about the lawful scope for mitigation measures
to be taken into account in determining the need for environmental impact assessment. As I go on to argue,
some but not all of this uncertainty is capable of being resolved, although I suggest that any such resolution
is unlikely to come from the courts but is better realised by legislative reform.
Phase 1: A purposeful beginning
Early case law is characterised by a strong emphasis on the value of public participation and against
reliance on developer mitigation.
In R. v Cornwall CC Ex p. Hardy29 the developer prepared an environmental statement but this did not
investigate the presence of bats—a legally protected species—even though it was known that the conditions
at the site were favourable. The court held that it was irrational to consider there might be a risk but simply
impose a condition requiring the developer to carry out a subsequent survey: this information should have
been provided in advance by the developer.30
Hardy is not a case directly about a developer’s offer of mitigation, but it could have been interpreted
as inferring that mitigation measures were not to be taken into account in deciding whether significant
environmental impacts were likely: in other words, decision-makers should not use ex post conditions as
a means of avoiding ex ante scrutiny of likely significant impacts. This view seemed to be confirmed in
R. (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire DC.31 The local planning authority decided that
the potential adverse impacts of a development would be insignificant with proper conditions and
management under enforceable agreements entered into between the developer and the decision-maker.
But the court, stressing the value of public participation, held that:
“the underlying purpose of the…Directive is that the potentially significant impacts of a development
are described together with a description of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and, where
possible, offset any significant adverse effects on the environment. Thus the public is engaged in the
process of assessing the efficacy of any mitigation measures. It is not appropriate for a person charged
with making a screening decision to start from the premise that although there may be significant
impacts, these can be reduced to insignificance by the application of conditions of various kinds. The
appropriate course in such a case is to require an environmental statement and the measures which
it is said will reduce their significance.”32
29R. v Cornwall CC Ex p. Hardy [2001] Env L.R. 25.
30Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/293).
31R. (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2002] EWHC 2009 (Admin).
32R. (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2002] EWHC 2009 (Admin) at [45]–[46].
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Taken together, these and other33 cases of the time suggested that conditional non-assessment would
not be permissible, at least where mitigation went beyond the “operation of standard conditions and a
reasonablymanaged development.”34 In striking the balance between participatory and substantive objectives
in favour of the former, they were, in the UK context at least, very much of their time,35 though they can
also be viewed as seeking to uphold substantively “better” decision-making as well.
Phase 2: A pragmatic turn
After Lebus, the Court of Appeal seemed to retreat from this interpretation and favour, albeit with some
lack of clarity and consensus, a more deferential, more pragmatic36 and less participatory approach. This
retreat, I suggest, has parallels in the more general retreat from the strictness of the approach in Berkeley37
and the subsequent stress upon EIA as an aid to effective decision and not an “obstacle course”.38
The first of these mitigation cases, Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie,39 concerned a
construction project on the contaminated site of an old gasworks, where a full picture of the contamination
could not be obtained until large gas holders had been removed. The decision-maker decided that EIA
was not required because a condition was attached to the permission which required detailed site
investigation to be done prior to the start of development. Somewhat different approaches were taken in
the Court of Appeal.40 According to Pill L.J., mitigation measures are not, in principle, to be ignored for
the purposes of screening, because that would distort the reality of the project proposal and would not
have proper regard to its “actual characteristics”.41 But the fact that conditions can take the effects of the
development below the threshold of significance is not enough to rule out the need for EIA. A range of
factors need to be considered, including the nature of the remedial measures, their complexity and the
degree of detail stipulated, and, in particular, the prospects that they will be successfully implemented.42
Laws L.J., however, thought that mitigation measures that take a project below the EIA threshold must
be ones in relation to which the “nature, availability and effectiveness are already plainly established and
plainly uncontroversial”.43 In effect, only mitigation measures of this kind would not require scrutiny and
public involvement, as required by the Directive. For Laws L.J., any degree of uncertainty about the
mitigation methods points towards the need for assessment. This approach, however, still begs the question
33British Telecommunications Plc v Gloucester CC [2001] EWHC Admin 1001 (“the question whether or not there are likely to be significant
environmental effects should be approached by asking whether these would be likely to result, absent some specific measures being taken to ameliorate
or reduce them. If they would, the environmental statement is required and the mitigating measures must be identified in it.”) At [73].
34R. (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2002] EWHC 2009 (Admin) at [45].
35Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Fulham Football Club [2001] 2 A.C. 603; [2001] Env. L.R.
16 HL.
36 I use pragmatic here in its practical, rather than philosophical, sense.
37Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Fulham Football Club [2001] 2 A.C. 603; [2001] Env. L.R.
16.
38R. (on the application of Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWCA Civ 1408; [2004] Env. L.R. 21 at [58] per Carnwath L.J. (“the EIA process is
intended to be an aid to efficient and inclusive decision-making in special cases, not an obstacle race”). See also Carnwath L.J. in Bown v Secretary
of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] Env. L.R. 509 at 526, that the speeches in Berkeley v Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport and the Regions and Fulham Football Club [2001] 2 A.C. 603; [2001] Env. L.R. 16 need to be read in context, approved by
Lord Hoffmann in R. (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22 at [64].
39Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 (“Gillespie”).
40Determining the ratio of Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 is tricky—Pill and Laws L.JJ.
give differing reasons. Arden L.J. agreed with both judgments but then briefly provided her own reasons.
41A phrase cited fromWorld Wildlife Fund (WWF) v Autonome Provinz Bozen (C-435/97) [1999] E.C.R. I-5613; [2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 149 (“In
deciding whether an EIA is necessary, “examination of the actual characteristics of any given project” is required” at [37]).The phrase is not found in
the EIA Directive and derives from earlier Court of Justice of the EU case law and has been used, by that court, only in relation to preventing wholesale
avoidance of assessment byMember States through overly generous thresholds. Its use in the context not ofMember State implementation but individual
decision-making is therefore not without difficulty.
42Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 per Pill L.J. at [39]–[41]. At first instance, Richards
J. had sought to distinguish “standard conditions” from “special and elaborate remediation measures”, which, typically, would be project-specific, see
Gillespie v First Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 8 (Admin) at [79].
43Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 at [46].
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whether the EIA process ensures that the best advice about mitigating environmental impact emerges
(which would be in line with the preventive and participatory dimensions to the Directive), not simply
advice that is standard or sufficient.44 Government guidance of the time, referring to Gillespie, noted:
“It is important that the offer of remediation measures is not used to frustrate the purpose of the EIA
directive or serve as a surrogate for it.”45
The mitigation issue was revisited in R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC.46 The
challenge was to the further renewal of a temporary planning permission for the use by Brighton and Hove
Albion Football Club of an athletics stadium. When screening, the Council had decided that traffic
management and other abatement measures could be taken into account in deciding whether there were
likely to be significant effects from noise and other disturbances. Pill L.J. followed his own judgment in
Gillespie, emphasising the need to consider cases on their facts. Notably, he sought to marginalise the
judgment of Laws L.J. in Gillespie finding it to be fact-specific and:
“not … asserting a general principle that, only when remedial measures are ‘uncontroversial’, can
they be taken into account when giving a screening opinion.”47
InCatt, there was some degree of controversy over some of the mitigationmeasures, in particular traffic
management measures which formed part of the mitigation package but which, after permission was
granted, were abandoned under the threat of a judicial review. On the other hand, because the application
related to an existing use, the court felt that the decision-maker had extensive knowledge and experience,
supported by surveys, of the environmental impact. The Council was entitled to assess the likely impact
of the additional capacity proposed in the context of the “continuing ameliorative measures” also proposed
and to determine that EIA was not required.48 As Pill L.J. put it:
“there will be cases where the likely effectiveness of conditions or proposed remedial or ameliorative
measures can be predicted with confidence. There may also be cases where the nature, size and
location of the development are such that the likely effectiveness of such measures is not crucial to
forming the opinion. It is not sufficient for a party to point to an uncertainty arising from the
implementation of the development, or the need for a planning condition, and conclude that an EIA
is necessarily required. An assessment, which almost inevitably involves a degree of prediction, is
required as to the effect of the particular proposal on the environment, and a planning judgment
made.”49
44 In Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCACiv 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30, the challenge to the absence of an EIAwas successful,
because the Secretary of State had wrongly assumed that the investigations and works contemplated could be treated, at the time of the screening
decision, as being properly implemented, and so having had a successful outcome. The planning condition which required comprehensive investigation
of the condition of the land did not provide a complete answer to the question whether significant effects on the environment were likely. The planning
condition “itself demonstrates the contingencies and uncertainties involved in the development proposal” and “when making the screening decision,
these contingencies must be considered and it cannot be assumed that at each stage a favourable and satisfactory result will be achieved”. Bellway
Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 at [40] and [41].
45Department for Communities and Local Government, Note on environmental impact assessment directive for local planning authorities, at http:
//webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/planningandbuilding/planning/sustainabilityenvironmental
/environmentalimpactassessment/noteenvironmental [Accessed September 24, 2011]; archived due to change of Government, but not revoked, likely
to be replaced by consolidated, web-based guidance.
46R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2007] EWCA Civ 298 (“Catt”). This decision was considered by the House of Lords but
permission refused because the permission had lapsed and the matter was academic. However, the House of Lords appeared not to think the matter
acte clair against Mr Catt. See, thereafter, subsequent litigation R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2009] EWHC 1639 (Admin),
an unsuccessful argument that the issue should be referred to the Court of Justice of the EU.
47R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2007] EWCA Civ 298 at [35].
48R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2007] EWCA Civ 298 at [37].
49R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2007] EWCA Civ 298 at [34] per Pill L.J. In R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton
and Hove CC [2009] EWHC 1639 (Admin), Sir Thayne Forbes thought the distinction between “prospective measures” and “tried and tested” controls
to be “an important one” at [18].
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Laws L.J. responded in R. (on the application of Dicken) v Aylesbury Vale DC,50 a challenge to the
failure to require EIA for development of a chicken farm. The issue was how, in terms of screening, to
deal with the measures which were intended to prevent pollution and nuisance. Without such mitigation,
significant effects might have arisen. Laws L.J. again stressed that ensuring effective public participation
was central. But here the court thought that the proposed operational and management system was not a
distinct remedial system that could be separated from the development.
“[I]f in truth there is nothing of substance to dispute, having regard … to plainly effective remedial
measures, whether or not part and parcel of the development itself, then as I see it there is no
requirement for an EIA.”51
It is also worth considering R. (on the application of Hart DC) v Secretary of State for Communities
and Local Government,52 a challenge to a grant of planning permission for a large residential development
in the vicinity of a Special Protection Area designated under the EU Wild Birds Directive,53 and hence a
case concerning appropriate assessment under the EU Habitats Directive. The concern was that new
residents would place pressure on the SPA, but the decision-maker decided that measures to deliver
alternative natural green space would draw residents away from and prevent a significant effect on the
SPA. Sullivan J thought that decision-makers should not “shut their eyes” to remedial measures and could,
alongside the characteristics of the project, properly consider these in determining whether appropriate
assessment was required.
“If the screening assessment should consider all of the other components or characteristics of the
proposed plan or project, why should a particular component or characteristic be ignored because it
has been incorporated into the project as a mitigation measure? … the competent authority [must]
consider whether the project, not some part of the project (shorn of anymitigating features incorporated
within it), is likely to have a significant effect on the SPA.”54
Although there is a different context to appropriate assessment,Hart is a very instructive case. It shows
the extent of deference even where there seems to be a degree of uncertainty about the outcome of the
mitigation, or at least a novel mitigation approach with no guarantee of success. In particular, the likely
effectiveness of the alternative green space did not seem to a matter of expert conservation judgement.
For the Court of Appeal in 2010 inMorge, the matter was seemingly clear:55
“In judging whether the effects are ‘significant’ regard may be had to mitigating measures taken or
to be taken to alleviate the harm. The focus is on the adverse effects.”
I would question whether this is correct. The EIA Directive is not restricted to significant adverse
effects, and in the case for example of compensatory measures aimed at making the net impact of a project
insignificant, it might well be that these would by themselves be significant, even though not “adverse”.
This seems to be the approach of the distinct test of Arden L.J. inGillespie: would the mitigation measures
be likely to have significant effects on the environment?56
50R. (on the application of Dicken) v Aylesbury Vale DC [2007] EWCA Civ 851.
51R. (on the application of Dicken) v Aylesbury Vale DC [2007] EWCA Civ 851 at [16].
52R. (on the application of Hart DC) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWHC 1204 (Admin) (“Hart”).
53Then, Directive 79/409 on the codification of birds [1979] OJ L103/1, as amended, now codified under Directive 2009/147 on the conservation
of wild birds [2009] OJ L20/7.
54R. (on the application of Hart DC) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWHC 1204 (Admin) at [56].
55R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire CC [2010] EWCA Civ 608 at [80].
56Bellway Urban Renewal Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 at [49].
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A central theme in this phase is a stress on an ordinary rationality standard in reviewing decisions about
significance. In Dicken andMorge, following earlier authority,57 the Court of Appeal held that in matters
relating to screening the test is simply one of irrationality.58 The breadth of discretion is such that even
where advisory reports indicate, e.g. significant disturbance to habitat, the decision-maker need not
conclude from these that there will be significant effects for the purposes of the EIA Directive.59 And in
at least one case, the courts have seemed disinclined to consider whether to require assessment even where
there is evidence that mitigation has in fact not been successful with respect to a particular development.60
Phase 3: From uncertainty to unease?
Reviewing this case law Robert McCracken has recently written:
“The Court of Appeal has struggled with [the mitigation] question. It accepts that mitigation measures
do not have to be ignored. But it has been unable to give clear guidance as to how to approach the
question of whether they should be. … It is easy to feel confused.”61
Three recent cases however may indicate a potential change of direction to the mitigation issue. In R.
(on the application of Birch) v Barnsley MBC62 planning permission had been granted for a facility for
composting green waste and then spreading this on agricultural land. EIA had not been required though
there had, as a precaution, been screening, which recognised a “potential” for “pollution/nuisance” to be
caused which would be “potentially” significant. The screening decision went on to say that the impacts
“should be controllable”, but did not say how. This approach was deemed by the Court of Appeal to be
unlawful because the planning permission did not prescribe what the minimum quality of the composted
material to be spread should be. This was:
“not merely inadequate, it was contrary to the underlying purpose of the Regulations63 … An EIA
was required so that the proposed controls could be identified and their adequacy thoroughly tested
through the EIA process.”64
On its particular facts, which as they relate to conditions are not dissimilar to those in Gillespie, Birch
is perhaps unremarkable because of the novelty and potential impact of the process involved and the
imprecision with which the controls were framed. However, it is also worth noting the remark of Sullivan
L.J. that “the council’s ‘wait and see, and serve an enforcement notice if necessary’ approach is the very
antithesis of the precautionary principle which underlies the Directive”.65 Surprisingly, this is a rare
reference to the precautionary principle in an EIA judgment from the UK courts, though it has recently
been referred to by Advocate General Kokott:
57 In particular R. (on the application of Jones) v Mansfield DC [2003] EWCA Civ 1408.
58R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire CC [2010] EWCA Civ 608 at [80] “for the court reviewing the decision, the test is rationality or
in the parlance of the ECJ, manifest error. If the Local Planning Authority ask the right question and arrive at an answer within the bounds of reason
and the four corners of the evidence before it, the decision cannot be categorised as unlawful”.
59R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire CC [2010] EWCA Civ 608. This issue was not raised on appeal whenMorge was taken to the
Supreme Court R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire CC [2011] UKSC 2.
60R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2009] EWHC 1639 (Admin).
61R. McCracken, “EIA, SEA and AA, Present Position: Where Are We Now?” [2010] J.P.L. 1515, 1520.
62R. (on the application of Birch) v Barnsley MBC [2010] EWCA Civ 1180.
63Citing R. (on the application of Lebus) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2002] EWHC 2009 (Admin) at [45] and Laws L.J. in Bellway Urban Renewal
Southern v Gillespie [2003] EWCA Civ 400; [2003] Env. L.R. 30 at [46].
64R. (on the application of Birch) v Barnsley MBC at [22]–[23].
65R. (on the application of Birch) v Barnsley MBC at [24]. The specific reference to precaution is an uneasy one because Recital 1 of the Directive
which is prayed in aid on this point refers to prevention but not precaution. However, precaution is expressly mentioned in Recital 2 to the amending
Directive 97/11 amending Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [1997] OJ L73/5.
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“The aim of environmental impact assessment is for the decision on a project to be taken with
knowledge of its effects on the environment and on the basis of public participation. Investigation
of the environmental effects makes it possible, in accordance with the first recital in the preamble to
the EIA directive and the precautionary principle under Art.174(2) of the Treaty, to prevent the
creation of pollution or nuisances where possible, rather than subsequently trying to counteract
them.”66
It is interesting to consider Birch alongside Loader v Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government, a case relating to a redevelopment project involving, amongst other things, asbestos removal
and landscape issues. At the time of writing two relevant permission decisions have been granted. In the
first, Standlen J. in the High Court granted permission on the ground that the decision-maker could not
simply rely on general statements of the developer that asbestos removal would be undertaken by complying
with all “relevant environmental standards”, where there was insufficient evidence to know how this
would be achieved and whether this would prevent any significant effects.67 On appeal,68Sullivan L.J.
allowed, as a further ground of appeal, that the mitigation question should not be considered in isolation
from the wider question, originally dismissed, of whether the correct test of significance should be a
rationality approach—which as noted had seemed to be settled upon—or the test set out in the European
Commission’s 2001 Guidance, which states that
“Those responsible for making screening decisions often find difficulties in defining what is
‘significant’. A useful simple check is to ask whether the effect is one that ought to be considered
and to have an influence on the development consent decision. At the early stage of Screening there
is likely to be little information on which to base this decision …”69
It is not obvious that this sets out a legal test, and the context is only a permission hearing with the low
threshold this entails. However, I suggest that the decision indicates a degree of unease or uncertainty
about the correct approach to mitigation in the wider context of the interpretation of significance. This
potential flux is also seen in R. (on the application of Buglife: the Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v
Medway Council,70 a challenge to the grant of outline planning permission for development of a business
park where one of the issues was that the Council had failed, in relation to what was development requiring
EIA, to take adequate mitigation and compensation measures. In particular, had the Council placed too
much legal weight on an EIA at the outline stage at the expense of requiring further EIAs as the more
precise nature of the development and of its impact unfolded? In light of recent developments with respect
to the assessment of multi-stage projects,71 this approach was unlawful. However, H.H. Judge Anthony
Thornton QC, sitting in the High Court, went on to consider the significance issue more generally.
“The Administrative Court is now obliged to determine, as part of the judicial review process,
antecedent factual conditions precedent. These would, or certainly could, include such matters as
whether the ES contained sufficient data to enable it to pass muster as a required ES notwithstanding
current authority suggesting that that question is a matter of discretion to be decided exclusively by
the planning authority. Moreover, the trend in the law of the European Union, and of English courts
when considering decisions arising from directives and other directly enforceable features of
Community law, is to require the English courts to apply objective standards of proportionality and
66Abraham v Region Wallonia (C-2/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-1197; [2008] Env. L.R. 32, Opinion of A.-G. Kokott at [75].
67R. (on the application of Loader) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 872 (Admin) [19].
68R. (on the application of v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWCA Civ 1305.
69Guidance on EIA: Screening (European Commission, 2001) B4.
70R. (on the application of Buglife: the Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v Medway Council [2011] EWHC 746 (Admin).
71Commission v UK (C-508/03) [2006] Q.B. 764; [2007] Env. L.R. 1; R. (on the application of Barker) v Bromley LBC (C-290/03) [2006] Q.B.
764; [2007] Env. L.R. 2.
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legal certainty instead of the subjectively-basedWednesbury tests. The challenge that Buglife wished
to mount in this judicial review is, therefore, now awaiting an appropriate case. It is not one however
that arises in this case.”
72
I return to the implications of this, and to whether precaution requires a heightened degree of scrutiny,
later.
The Embrace of Mitigation in the United States under NEPA
Under the National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (“NEPA”) an environmental impact statement (“EIS”)
must be prepared for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”73
The EIS must consider mitigation measures.74
Unless agreed in advance that a full EIS will be needed a simplified environmental assessment must
be undertaken.75 This screening process may decide that an EIS is required or might result in a “finding
of no significant impact” (“FONSI”). However, a variant is a “mitigated FONSI”—a finding that the
actions are not of significant impact because of the mitigation measures proposed. A mitigated FONSI
allows agencies to bring plans, projects or other actions below the threshold of significance for preparing
the far more onerous EIS.
Of particular note is the extent to which NEPA allows both mitigation and compensation measures to
be taken into account in reaching a mitigated FONSI finding. The importance of this is that the “mitigated
FONSI” covers a wide range of practices intended to bring federal actions covered by NEPA below the
significance threshold.76 In one of the leading decisions the DC Circuit held, uneasily mixing the language
of mitigation and compensation, that:
“If… the proposal is modified prior to implementation by adding specific mitigation measures which
completely compensate for any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original
proposal, the statutory threshold of significant environmental effect is not crossed and an EIS is not
required.”77
72R. (on the application of Barker) v Bromley LBC (C-290/03) [2006] Q.B. 764; [2007] Env. L.R. 2 at [87].
73 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). “Little-NEPAs” perform a similar role in some states, though sometimes with a substantive edge and different approaches
may be taken in determining significance, see D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation (Thomson/West updated) § 12.15.
74 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h) (1998). See Robertson v Methow Valley Citizens Council (1989) 490 U.S. 332, 351–352 (“one important
ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences”). The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the view that an enforceable mitigation plan must be adopted before an agency can act, 352–353.
75The initial, simplified environmental assessment process, now enshrined in regulations, was originally a product of the courts” finding that any
decision not to require an EIS must be based on a “reviewable environmental record” produced following public consultation, see Hanly v Kleindienst
(2d Cir. 1972) 471 F.2d 823, 836. This approach has been modified, and whether there needs to be, e.g., a draft EA on which the public may comment
may depend on the facts, see D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation (Thomson/West updated) § 7.14.1.
76 “Mitigation” includes: (a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action. (b) Minimizing impacts by limiting
the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation. (c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment.
(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action. (e) Compensating for the
impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.” CEQ Guidance § 1508.20.
77Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v Peterson (DC Cir. 1982)685 F.2d 678, 682. The strained language of compensation can also be seen in e.g.
CARE Now Inc v FAA (11th Cir. 1988)844 F.2d 1569 (considering preventive noise abatement measures). The same is the case under certain state
laws, for example in New York off-site compensation is lawful so long as it is the impact of the assessed activity, and not other activities, that is being
offset, and there is a reasonable relation between the conditions and the purposes of the legislation, see P. Karmel and L. M. Barry “Mitigation of
Environmental Impacts under SEQRA”, Environmental Law in New York, 19(2), 21, 24 (Feb 2007).
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It seems settled that, beyond preventive measures, activities which, e.g. compensate for lost habitat,
wetland or other ecosystem functioning can count as “mitigation” in a NEPA context, both on-site or
off-site,78 and there is academic support for the general desirability of this.79 Indeed, the view from the
courts seems to be that mitigation measures need not necessarily provide “complete compensation” for
the environmental impacts of a proposed action so long as the net impacts mean that an EIS is not required.80
To be effective in achieving compliance with NEPA’s EIS requirements, mitigation measures must
meet two criteria: they must reduce the net environmental impact of the project to below the threshold of
significance requiring preparation of an EIS, and they must be effective and enforceable. … There is no
priority or hierarchy among the use of the different types of mitigationmeasures. On the other hand, where
proposed mitigation measures are poorly conceived and enforcement doubtful, they will not be sufficient
to eliminate the need to prepare an EIS.81
Taking mitigation into account in this way is not expressly provided for in NEPA, nor do the governing
CEQRegulations cover the role of mitigationwhen federal agencies decide not to prepare impact statements.
However, the regulations of various federal environmental regulatory agencies do approve the practice.82
Crucially, the emergence of mitigated FONSIs was sanctioned by the courts,83 and their use appears to
account for a high proportion of findings of no significant impact.84 Their use dwarfs, by a factor of around
100 to 1, the number of actions that require an EIS. An attempt by the CEQ to confine the use of mitigated
FONSIs to situations where the mitigation measures “were imposed by statute or regulation, or submitted
by an applicant or agency as part of the original proposal” was rejected by most courts on the basis that
the guidance was non-binding.85 In general terms, then, the federal courts have embraced the bypassing
of full assessment requirements through their stance on mitigation measures, and the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard is used in according federal decision-makers considerable deference in making a
mitigated FONSI.86
Evaluation
For Brad Karkkainen, as for others, the use of mitigated FONSIs is to be embraced:
“The widespread use of the mitigated FONSI is the best evidence we have that NEPA is actually
altering agency decision-making and improving environmental performance. Agencies are redefining
projects to include mitigation measures that reduce adverse environmental impacts below the
significant” threshold. Moreover, through use of the mitigated FONSI, they are presumably achieving
78D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation (Thomson/West updated).
79T. Schoenbaum and R. Stewart, “The Role of Mitigation and Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with Environmental Regulatory
Statutes: Lessons from Section 316 of the Clean Water Act” (2000) 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 237, 277; M. Bulson, “Off-Site Mitigation and the EIS
Threshold: NEPA’s Faulty Framework” (1992) 41 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L.101.
80National Parks and Conservation Association v Babbitt (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 722.
81T. Schoenbaum and R. Stewart, “The Role of Mitigation and Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with Environmental Regulatory
Statutes: Lessons from Section 316 of the Clean Water Act” (2000) 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 237, 279.
82 See 1987–1988 CEQ Ann. Rep. 258. For the US Environmental Protection Agency see 40 C.F.R. § 6.105(f) and § 6.508(a). T. Schoenbaum and
R. Stewart, “The Role of Mitigation and Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with Environmental Regulatory Statutes: Lessons from
Section 316 of the Clean Water Act” (2000) 8 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 237.
83Maryland-National Park & Planning Commission v US Postal Service (DC Cir. 1973)487 F.2d. 1029, Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v Peterson
(DC Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 678, 682. For a comprehensive overview of the case law upholding mitigated FONSIs see B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter
NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 932 fn.129. On the case law from the
US federal circuits which have approved the use of mitigated FONSI see D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation (Thomson/West updated) § 8.57.
84Council on Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness After Twenty-Five Years 19 (1997). This
places certain limitations in any comparison, since the absence of “full assessment” in the context of NEPA does not necessarily equate to the absence,
e.g. of impact assessment under the EC EIA Directive.
85Friends of the Earth v Hintz (9th Cir.1986) 800 F.2d 822, 838.
86Marsh v Oregon Natural Resources Council (1989) 490 U.S. 360.
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these environmentally beneficial results at a lower cost and in less time than would be required if
they went through the full-blown EIS process. That is a positive outcome, not a negative one. It is
evidence that NEPA works.”87
The considerable expense to agencies of otherwise preparing an EIS acts as an important driver to
mitigate environmental harms.88 This, it has been argued, makes for a procedural penalty default rule—the
full rigour of the assessment process is so burdensome that the proponent and decision-maker have an
incentive to find creative ways to work around these obligations.89 And compared to a full-blown EIS the
“mitigated FONSI” facilitates design changes at an earlier stage in gestation. Waiting for the findings of
an EIS before adapting the proposal is likely to lead to more expensive, less creative and probably less
effective “bolt-on” mitigation solutions.90
Mitigated FONSIs, then, act contrary to how the authors of NEPA intended—or assumed—impact
assessment would work. For its architects, the EIS would identify the likely impacts and, through political
pressure fuelled by the information generated by the EIS, weed out inappropriate activities or inform the
selection of appropriate mitigation measures.91 Mitigated FONSIs, however, indirectly allow substantive
standards into the process, thereby achieving NEPA’s original purposes by, as Karkkainen has put it, an
“unanticipated backdoor route”.92
To their critics, however, mitigated FONSIs are inherently suspect, a dodge justified on the basis of
circular reasoning because a finding of no significant impact must begin with a formal investigation of
those impacts.93 The problem of circularity of course is inherent to any impact assessment law which
requires assessment of plans or projects on the basis of their likely significant effects rather than on the
basis solely of any objective criteria such as whether the activity falls within a class (e.g. requiring
assessment for all motorways). It is a problemwhich, as the mitigated FONSI illustrates, does not go away
if an initial, simplified, assessment process is used.94 A more forceful criticism relates to agency failure
to determine whether the mitigation was actually implemented or effective: monitoring is neither high
profile nor the first priority of agencies with stretched budgets.95
87B. Karkkainen, “Whither NEPA?” (2004) N.Y.U. Envtl L.R. 333, 348–349. See also D. Farber, “Bringing Environmental Assessment into the
Digital Age”, in J. Holder and D.McGillivray (eds), Taking Stock of Environmental Impact Assessment: Law, Policy and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish,
2007) 227.
88Cost differential appears the main motivation for agencies to choose mitigated FONSIs over full EISs, see A. Herson, “Project Mitigation Revisited:
Most Courts Approve Findings of No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation” (1986) 13 Ecology L. Q. 51, 68–69. Sabine River Authority v US
Dept. of Interior (5th Cir.1993) 951 F.2d 669, 677. In fact, many EAs are far from brief—the EA discussed in Spiller v White (5th Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d
235 extended to 4 volumes and 2,400 pages.
89B. Karkkainen, “Whither NEPA?” (2004) N.Y.U. Envtl L.R. 333, 350. See more generally B. Karkkainen, “Information-Forcing Environmental
Regulation” (2006) 33 Fla. State Univ.L.Rev.861. In the UK, a penalty default variant is Pt 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 governing
contaminated land, under which voluntary remediation—for example, through redevelopment—prevents a remediation notice being served (s.78H(5A)),
see S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Environmental Law, 7th edn (OUP, 2008) 574.
90G. McDonald and L. Brown, “Going Beyond Environmental Impact Assessment: Environmental Input to Planning and Design” (1995) 15 Env.
Impact Ass. Rev. 483, 487. J. Treweek, Ecological Impact Assessment (Blackwell, 1999) 219.
91B. Karkkainen, “NEPA and the Curious Evolution of Environmental Impact Assessment in the United States” in J. Holder and D. McGillivray
(eds), Taking Stock of Environmental Impact Assessment: Law, Policy and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); L. Caldwell, The National
Environmental Policy Act: An Agenda for the Future (Indiana University Press, 1998) xvi–xvii; M. J. Lindstrom and Z. A. Smith, The National
Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Misconstruction, Legislative Indifference and Executive Neglect (Texas A and M University Press, 2002) 39.
92B. Karkkainen, “NEPA and the Curious Evolution of Environmental Impact Assessment in the United States” in J. Holder and D. McGillivray
(eds), Taking Stock of Environmental Impact Assessment: Law, Policy and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 58. The National Environmental
Policy Act, A Study of Its Effectiveness After Twenty-five Years, Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President, January 1997
p.19 (“Conceived as a brief analysis to determine the significance of environmental effects, the EA today increasingly includes mitigation measures
that reduce adverse effects below significant levels”).
93 P. Eglick and H. Hiller, “The Myth of Mitigation Under NEPA and SEPA” (1990) 20 Envtl. L. 773, 776; cf. M. Herz, “Parallel Universes: NEPA
Lessons for the New Property” (1993) 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1668, 1712–1713 (“only by going through the process can the agency decide whether it is
necessary to go through the process”). See also W. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, 2nd edn (West, 1994) 893–894.
94Mini-EIA was recommended by the Commission in its first five-year review of the EIA Directive, Commission (EC) Report from the Commission
of the Implementation of Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of certain public and private projects on the environment” COM (93) 28 final, but
has never been taken up.
95See e.g. D. Bear, “Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act” (2003) 43 Nat. Resources
J. 931, 944 (“Post-decisional NEPA has been like the dark side of the moon: one knows it is there, but in the world of government agencies, no one
can see it.”)
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Aswith the case law under the EIADirective, the case law on the degree to which the proposedmitigation
measures must in fact be adopted and implemented (to say nothing of subsequently complied with) appears
somewhat divergent. As Bill Rodgers notes:
“the case law on mitigated FONSIs is thoroughly divided around the proposition of how firm and
binding the mitigation must be to avoid an EIS.”96
And there is a wealth of evidence, at least in respect of replacement habitat, about the extent to which
compensatory measures fall short.97 For some, then, there are in practice no adverse consequences on
proponents from overstating the impact of mitigation and compensationmeasures and from underestimating
adverse environmental effects, and the promise of monitored mitigation rings hollow.98
Further criticisms of mitigated FONSIs are that they constrict public participation (some agencies
provide for public comment before a FONSI determination is made, others do not) and encourage “behind
closed doors” negotiation between dominant stakeholders; lead to less rigorous scientific analysis and
risk assessment; and limit both the consideration of alternatives and of the activity’s benefits. All of these
can be seen to go against the spirit of NEPA and, in consequence, to turn the impact assessment process
into “a compliance requirement rather than a tool to improve decision-making”.99
Tackling problems of prediction
Mitigation and predicted effects
Literature relating to the EU EIA Directive suggests that a significant percentage of full assessment
predictions made are inaccurate,100 and empirical evidence in the United Kingdom suggests a similar
difficulty with the lack of auditability of predictions made by project proponents.101 Dan Farber makes a
similar point about NEPA. While taking mitigation into account has a number of attractions:
“only a third of predictions in [environmental impact statements] were ‘particularly accurate’, most
of the remainder being ‘either accurate solely by virtue of the vagueness of the forecast or somewhat
inaccurate in various complicated ways’ … the unreliability of the predictions makes the use of
mitigated FONSIs a bit suspect, since we cannot have any real confidence that the mitigationmeasures
will actually reduce the impacts below the ‘significance’ level.”102
This, of course, projects from experience with full EISs to what is likely to be the case with mitigated
FONSIs. It might be expected that impact predictions in mitigated FONSIs would be less reliable because
of less detailed baseline monitoring, though against this activities requiring a full EIS are probably, by
96W. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, 2nd edn (West, 1994), 894.
97K. ten Kate, J. Bishop and R. Bayon (eds) Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience and the Business Case (London: IUCN, Cambridge and Insight
Investment, 2004).
98 See e.g. D. Hodas, “NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental Accounting” (2000) 14 Natural Resources and Environment 185, 188
(“although courts will carefully examine agency claims that permit conditions and mitigation measures will so reduce environmental effects that an
EIS is not needed, once this determination is made, the courts simply assume that the conditions will be enforced, even in the absence of any binding
assurances. Unfortunately, the failure of an agency to enforce is presumptively nonreviewable,Heckler v Chaney (1985) 470 U.S. 821, 831, and NEPA
contains no private right of action or citizen suit provision.”)
99The National Environmental Policy Act, A Study of Its Effectiveness After Twenty-five Years, Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office
of the President, January 1997, 20. For a recent review of criticisms see R. Rawlins, “Institutionalizing the Mitigated FONSI: A Precautionary Tale”
(2007) 37 Environmental Law Reporter 10666 (“the NEPA process has been degraded by the mitigated FONSI”).
100A. Tennøy, J. Kvaerner and KI Gjerstad, “Uncertainty in environmental impact predictions—the need for better communication and more
transparency” (2006) 24(1) Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 45.
101C. Wood, B. Dipper and C. Jones, “Auditing the Assessment of the Environmental Impacts of Planning Projects: Results” (2000) 43(1) J. of
Envtl. Planning & Management 23.
102Farber, “Bringing Environmental Assessment into the Digital Age”, in J. Holder and D. McGillivray (eds), Taking Stock of Environmental Impact
Assessment: Law, Policy and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 239–240, citing P. J. Culhane, H. P. Friesema and J. A. Beecher, Forecasts and
Environmental Decisionmaking: The Content and Predictive Accuracy of Environmental Impact Statements (Westview Press, 1987) 253.
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their nature, inherently more controversial and uncertain. There appears not to be any specific literature
on the predictive quality of mitigation measures in mitigated FONSIs, but it would be surprising if their
predictive accuracy was any greater than in EISs.
There is a further bias, in the literature, in terms of conceiving of post-decision actions which try to
address the problem of uncertainty of anticipated impacts only in the context where impact assessment
has been required.103 This contrasts with the kinds of situations, discussed here, where impact assessment
is not required. As I focus on what we to do when a plan or project has not been formally assessed because
mitigation-typemeasures are held to take it below the assessment threshold, my interest is in the follow-up
measures, if any, which could be required in that situation.
Follow-through approaches
Given these problems it is worth exploring, and I argue here for, alternative approaches to screening which
place somewhat less faith in ex ante significance decisions when mitigation is at issue. In this context the
work of Karkkainen deserves particular attention. Despite his enthusiasm for mitigated FONSIs, noted
above, this is only a qualified approval:
“I said ‘Bravo!’ to the mitigated FONSI, but only up to a point. The missing elements here are
verification, transparency, and accountability—shortcomings in the entire NEPA system, but especially
in the netherworld of FONSIs and mitigated FONSIs, where most NEPA compliance efforts occur
outside the glare of public scrutiny. … If we want to ensure that mitigation measures are achieving
environmentally beneficial results, at some point we need to see what has actually happened and to
know whether the predictions were correct.”104
Karkkainen makes a number of attractive suggestions designed to address the issue of impacts being
“significant” but for the mitigation measures specified in a mitigated FONSI, and related problems
associated with checking mitigation measures.105 He argues for post-decision monitoring in three specific
situations: first, where any impacts are determined to reach the level of “significant” in an EIS; secondly,
where any impacts would be “significant” but for the mitigation measures specified either in an EIS or in
a mitigated FONSI; and thirdly, where any impacts identified in an EA or EIS for which sufficient
uncertainty exists as to their likelihood of occurrence or degree that the determination whether they are
“significant” lies within the range of expected uncertainty in the analysis, including uncertain environmental
benefits of mitigationmeasures or impact avoidance strategies.106 The emphasis, then, is on specific impacts,
rather than whole projects, and is carefully crafted both to include situations where there is not a full EIA
but to avoid the standard complaint—of proponents and governments alike—that post-decisionmonitoring
is likely to be too expansive and therefore too time-consuming and costly.
In this context it is notable that in California, post-decision follow-up to the equivalent (under California
state environmental assessment legislation) of mitigated FONSIs (but not full EISs) is already a requirement.
If a “mitigated negative declaration” is made, the statute and implementing regulations expressly require
monitoring and reporting in order to verify that the required mitigation measures are in fact implemented
103 e.g. EIA follow-up defined as “[t]he monitoring and evaluation of the impacts of a project or plan (that has been subject to EIA) for management
of, and communication about, the environmental performance of that project or plan”, A. Morrison-Saunders and J. Arts (eds), Assessing Impact:
Handbook of EIA and SEA Follow-up (Earthscan, 2004) 4 (emphasis added). Similarly, Stallworthy suggests the use of follow-up procedures, e.g.
through conditions attaching to actual environmental impact, only in the context of EIA having taken place, M. Stallworthy, Sustainability, Land Use
and the Environment: A Legal Analysis (Cavendish, 2002) 153.
104B. Karkkainen, “Whither NEPA?” (2004) N.Y.U. Envtl L.R. 333, 348–349. For review of practice in translating mitigation predictions into legal
conditions in England see L. Tinker, D. Cobb, A. Bond and M. Cashmore, “Impact mitigation in environmental impact assessment: paper promises or
the basis of consent conditions?” (2005) 23(4) Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 265.
105B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 940–947.
106B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 940.
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and that the environmental impacts are, in fact, insignificant.107 There is some evidence that these
requirements are moderately effective, but the absence of public access to information on the mitigation
measures and to the monitoring data is said to make assessing compliance impossible.108 However, it has
also been noted that:
“attention to compliance with mitigation measures may be significantly less than attention to initial
decisions, andmitigation conditionsmay bemodified or deleted if an agency finds them ‘impracticable
or unworkable’.”109
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, there is exhortation—but no legal requirement—to link
impact assessment with environmental management systems.110
Specifically in relation to bypassing the need for full assessment, Karkkainen advocates both “contingent
FONSIs” and “adaptive mitigation”. If the predicted impact, or the predicted effect of the mitigation
measures, is uncertain, a finding of no significant impact would be made contingent upon the relevant
agency adopting a monitoring plan to establish whether the project has actually remained below the
significance threshold—a contingent FONSI. If it has not then either a full assessment could be
undertaken,111 or further mitigation could take the project back below the threshold. Hence, the FONSI
would be:
“a provisional but ultimately testable predictive claim, and as a legal matter its validity would be
made contingent on the verified level of actual impacts and/or the verified success of the mitigation
plan over the life of the project.”112
This approach, he suggests, might reduce the risk of litigation, because it would remove much of the
uncertainty about whether a full EIS was required.
Additionally, “adaptive mitigation” is proposed whereby a range of possible impacts would be matched
to a corresponding menu of mitigation measures identified in the FONSI, hence combining ex ante and
ex post approaches.113 This approach aims to link the degree of uncertainty inherent in environmental
decision-making with a degree of certainty about what will be required in the event that the actual effects
differ from the predicted effects. This ought to lead to an enhanced degree of predictability not just for
developers but also for other stakeholders.
Both the contingent FONSI and adaptive mitigation, then, display pragmatic properties in recognising
uncertainties in knowledge and the value of adaptive experimentation, monitoring and adjustment in
overcoming these knowledge gaps. Indeed, a key driver for Holling, the founding father of adaptation
107California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21,081.6, available at http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/stat/21080_et_seq._web_final.pdf
[Accessed September 24, 2011]. Restricting follow-up to this class of cases and not to EISs would at the margins probably disincentivise the use of
mitigated FONSI-type approaches, which may not be desirable, B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 954.
108Farber, “Bringing Environmental Assessment into the Digital Age”, in J. Holder and D. McGillivray (eds), Taking Stock of Environmental Impact
Assessment: Law, Policy and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 231. Farber makes a number of recommendations to cure this information deficit.
See also C. Wood, Environmental Assessment: A Comparative Review, 2nd edn (Prentice Hall, 2003).
109 Lincoln Place Tenants Assn v City of Los Angeles (Cal Ct App 2005)31 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 353, 366–367, cited in D. Owen, “Climate change and
environmental assessment law” (2008) 33 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 57.
110Council on Environmental Quality,Aligning NEPAProcesses with Environmental Management Systems—AGuide for NEPA and EMSPractitioners
(2007); DETR, Circular 02/99 Environmental Impact Assessment.
111Certain agencies now require something like this, see e.g. Department of the Army, Environmental Analysis of Army Actions, Final Rule, 32
C.F.R. § 651.15(c) (2003) (requiring EIS if in practice the measures which led to a mitigated FONSI do not take an activity below the significance
threshold).
112B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 943.
113B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 945 (“agencies would be authorized to incorporate adaptive mechanisms into the mitigated FONSI itself, specifying in advance an expected range
of uncertainties and offering a corresponding range of mitigation measures, to be triggered and adjusted in response to actual impacts subsequently
revealed by monitoring data.”)
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theory, was the perceived shortcomings of “fixed review” assessment techniques, such as the EIS procedure
under NEPA, when considering the dynamic properties of ecological systems,114 though it has been argued
that “NEPA is not a barrier but rather a framework for implementing adaptive management”.115
For some, however, there are dangers that an adaptive approach to screening would create additional
difficulties. As Rawlins puts it:
“[a]daptive management may addmore to the problem than the solution.With adaptive management,
it is even easier to dismiss uncertainty and assume a FONSI with the idea that the mitigation will be
adjusted to resolve any significant impacts.”116
The problem of developer (and in those cases where the decision-maker is supportive of the development,
decision-maker) bias, at least ex ante, might therefore increase.
Making assessment avoidance a more consciously contingent or adaptive process, then, is not without
its critics and its risks, nor would proposals of the kind sketched above be without some cost. But arguably
approaches of this kind would bring benefits in terms of lessening the degree of antagonism between
stakeholders holding opposing perspectives, and anticipating differing degrees of environmental harm.117
Karkkainen’s blueprint offers alternatives that might take us beyond the degree of clairvoyance that seems
to characterise the current law relating to significance and impact assessment avoidance, and a seeming
fixation with the apparently binary choice of whether to require formal assessment or not. Moreover, such
proposals are in step with developments in environmental law and policy which emphasise the dynamic
and unpredictable qualities of the natural environment and the value of adaptive management,118 and with
developments in regulatory theory which stress the need for iteration, learning and the value of
experimentation rather than certainty and finality.119 The following section considers the application of
these and other possible approaches to following through on mitigation claims in EIA screening.
Reshaping EU law and practice
If the current state of the law is unacceptably uncertain, and potentially stifling of legitimate public
participation about mitigation measures, then it seems to me that the alternatives in the EU context divide
into those which are directed to one-off screening decisions (“screening approaches”), and those which
combine screening with follow-through approaches. The latter would likely involve specific amendment
to the EIA Directive, whereas the former might be achieved through the courts or by changes to guidance.
114C. S. Holling (ed) Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (Wiley, 1978). For an excellent summary see J. Nagle and J. B. Ruhl,
The Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management (Foundation Press, 2002) 335–339.
115D. Bear, “Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act” (2003) 43 Nat. Resources J. 931,
949.
116R. Rawlins, “Institutionalizing the Mitigated FONSI: A Precautionary Tale” (2007) 37 Environmental Law Reporter 10666, 10673.
117On the “unavoidable interaction” between adaptive management and public participation, especially at the level of localities and communities,
see B. Norton, Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 94–95.
118R. Brooks, R. Jones and R. Virginia, Law and Ecology: The Rise of the Ecosystem Regime (Ashgate, 2002) (focusing on wider scale ecosystem
management); R. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (University of Chicago Press, 2004), especially Ch.2; D. Tarlock, “The Future of
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation” (2000) 17 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 237; B. Karkkainen, A. Fung and C. Sable, “After Backyard Environmentalism:
Toward a Performance-BasedRegime of Environmental Regulation” (2000) 44(4)American Behavioral Scientist 690; J. Ruhl, “Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law” (1997) 34 Hous. L. R. 101.
119D. Farber, “Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience” (1994) 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 791; D. Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance” (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 444, 452; C. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, “Directly-Deliberative
Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe” in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP, 2002). On
the gap between law as it is and experimentalist modes of governance see e.g. J. Scott and D. Trubek “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the EU” (2002) 8 E.L.J. 1.
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Screening approaches
A more minimalist, screening-centred perspective might approach the mitigation issue by rethinking the
meaning of significance and the standard of review that decision-makers are held to in making screening
decisions. Foreshadowing both Loader and the stress on precaution in Birch, McCracken, for example,
argues that:
“[u]ltimately it is a question of judgement to be approached both with a sense of proportion and a
commitment to participatory decision making in accordance with the precautionary principle.”120
There is much in this deceptively simple suggestion, both in the sense that it is attractive but also because
it points to the need to depart from a straight rationality standard and adopt a heightened review standard
which gives effect to the precautionary nature of EIA.
Howmight this be achieved?Onewaywould be by adopting a narrower screening threshold, for example
so that mitigation measures could only be taken into account if they could not rationally be the subject of
any form of representation if there was consultation on them, in the sense that they could not conceivably
be improved upon or criticised.121 This could be backed by extended duties to give reasons for negative
screening decisions.122 It might also be advanced by the courts taking a broader construction of the
circumstances where the decision-maker ought to be asking for additional information. For McCracken
the test would focus on mitigation measures being certain to be taken and certain to work, and could be:
“Would an open minded adviser to the competent authority or member of the public concerned about
the potential [significant environment effects] want the systematic assembly of the EIA data to judge
how effective the proposed [mitigation measure] would be?”123
This kind of approach would not diminish the participatory nature of assessment nor the self-regulatory
or penalty default functions. It would also emphasise the effectiveness of the mitigation measures without
making the decision-maker’s assessment of its effectiveness the overriding factor.
Returning to NEPA, it is worth noting that at the initial environmental assessment stage there is a general
duty to involve the public to the extent practicable,124 although a low threshold to meet this test seems to
be applied. Also, an agency must make a FONSI available for public review when the proposed action is,
or is closely similar to, an action which normally requires an EIS, and if the nature of the proposed action
is without precedent in the agency’s experience.125 Public comment on a draft environmental assessment
is not required in every case but will depend on the circumstances.126 However, a key difficulty with public
review in this context lies in what the public is able to review. At least to its critics, the more abbreviated
EA process deprives the public of meaningful discussion of risks, alternatives, benefits and so on.127
Nevertheless, there are pointers here to some factors which, perhaps via guidance, might be adopted in
relation to screening.
120R. McCracken, “EIA, SEA and AA, Present Position: Where Are We Now?” [2010] J.P.L. 1515, 1520.
121The argument raised in R. (on the application of Catt) v Brighton and Hove CC [2009] EWHC 1639 (Admin).
122Following R. (on the application of Mellor) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (C-75/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-3799; [2010]
Env. L.R. 2.
123R. McCracken, “EIA, SEA and AA, Present Position: Where Are We Now?” [2010] J.P.L. 1515, 1520.
124 40 CFR § 1508.9(a)(1).
125 40 CFR § 1501.4(e) (2)(i) and (ii). Council on Environmental Quality guidance states that public review is appropriate if, for example, the
proposed action is (a) a “borderline case”, where a reasonable argument may be made for preparing an EIS; (b) an “unusual case” or a new or precedent
setting case, such as a first intrusion of even a minor development into a pristine area; (c) the subject of scientific or public controversy; or (d) is similar
or closely similar to one which normally requires preparation of an EIS, see Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental
Policy Act Regulations, No.37b.
126 See, e.g. Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res Dev v US Army Corp of Engineers (9th Cir, 2008) 511 F.3d 1011, overturning Citizens to
Preserve Better Forestry v US Department of Agriculture (9th Cir, 2003) 341 F.3d 961. See generally D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation
(Thomson/West updated § 7:14.1.
127 See R. Rawlins, “Institutionalizing the Mitigated FONSI: A Precautionary Tale” (2007) 37 Environmental Law Reporter 10666.
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Finally here it is worth returning to the issue of the appropriate standard of review. As I have indicated,
there are some signs of unease about a rationality standard being used. Although determining significance
may involve expert evidence and be highly subjective,128 the EU EIA Directive is intended to be both a
preventive and precautionary regime and as such this may properly call for a heightened degree of judicial
scrutiny of decision-making.129And of course as an EU lawmeasure, the principle of effectiveness applies.
It therefore seems problematic that the English courts, by applying the same deferential, rationality standard
to the jurisdictional and more legal question whether assessment is required as it is to decisions taken if
assessment is required. It remains to be seen whether this approach would be upheld by the Court of Justice
of the European Union in relation to the EIA Directive, but there must be some doubt.
Californian case law is notable here. The judicial approach is that because a mitigated FONSI-type
decision prevents full assessment, in principle a low, fair argument, threshold is applied.130 On the other
hand, a decision about the sufficiency of mitigation measures:
“lies at the core of the lead agency’s discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason,
not lightly to be overturned.”131
But it seems clear that conflicts of evidence are to be resolved in favour of requiring full assessment.
Combined approaches
While screening-centred approaches may offer some improvement, consideration should also be given in
the European Union to approaches which include follow-through measures. Space prevents a full analysis
here of the specific details of what these might look like, but in essence I suggest that some degree of
post-decision monitoring—as a trigger for contingent or adaptive measures—is justified as the price of
non-assessment and of keeping to the promise that significant effects will not arise. It is worth noting that
post-decisionmonitoring is required under other assessment regimes where there is a substantive dimension.
Post-decision monitoring is an implicit requirement of the EU Habitats Directive: the Court of Justice of
the European Union has reinforced the need to take proactive steps to deal with problems that were not
predicted as part of the appropriate assessment.132 Within this regime, what now tends to be thought of as
a general monitoring andmanagement measure133 could be used as a means through which either contingent
or adaptive assessment might evolve. However, for the purposes of the EIA Directive amendment to the
Directive is likely to be needed.
If there is to be contingent or adaptive screening, there will need to be a clear trigger point for activating
“re-assessment” measures. This will involve an obligation, on the decision-maker, to monitor the actual
impacts of the avoidance measures. Lessons would need to be learnt from those jurisdictions where
post-decision monitoring is required. For example, in the Netherlands, follow-up measures are legally
required, but there is no penalty for not doing so, no institution charged with acting when the rules are
128 J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision-Making (OUP, 2004) 37 (significance is a “highly subjective and difficult
evaluation”).
129D. Edwards “Judicial Review, The Precautionary Principle and the Protection of Habitats: Do We Yet Have a System of Administrative Law?”
Paper presented at “The Habitats Directive: A Developer’s Obstacle Course?” King’s College London, March 17, 2011, “the absence of a systematic
approach to the appropriate intensity of judicial review causes courts particular difficulties when they are required to decide cases raising the precautionary
principle. It is not clear what the standard of review should be, either for questions of law or the assessment of complex evidence relied on by
decision-makers” (p.29).
130Citizen Action To Serve All Students v Thornley (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 748, 754 (272 Cal. Rptr. 83) (the fair argument test provides a low
threshold for requiring an environmental impact report. The standard is whether substantial evidence in the record supports a fair argument that the
project may have a significant environmental impact. If so, a report is required; if not, a negative declaration will suffice).
131City of Marina v Board of Trustees of Cal State Univ (Cal. 2006) 138 P.3d 692, 710.
132 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee, Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Visserij (C-127/02) [2005] All E.R. (EC) 353; [2005] Env. L.R. 14, [36]–[37].
133Under Habitats Directive art.6(2).
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not followed, and no private enforcement remedies in cases of non-compliance.134 Reforms ought to
combine an enforceable general duty to review with scope for private activation,135 combined with an
enforceable duty on the decision-maker to take any steps necessary to ensure that significant impacts
arising from unassessed mitigationmeasures are, within a reasonable timeframe, addressed so as to prevent
the continuation of the significant impact.136 Screening follow-through which led to assessment might then
be one of the exceptional reasons for allowing retrospective assessment. The Court of the Justice of the
EU has held that retrospective assessment is unlawful, unless done exceptionally and with safeguards to
prevent circumvention of the purposes of the Directive.137
Care would need to be taken, though, in distinguishing between situations where mitigation is ineffective
because a regulatory permission is not being complied with, and (as in Hart) where the problem is that a
condition assumed to prevent significant effects might not in fact do so. In the latter situation there may
be nothing to enforce against, so the emphasis needs to be on further, additional obligations to prevent
significant effects, not enforcement.
One possible adaptive approach is to use environmental externality performance bonds and insurance,
i.e. securitisation. In the United States this approach has been advanced by Hodas.138 His proposals may
be criticised as overly complex, somewhat economistic and inflexible (e.g. placing a dollar value per
additional unanticipated car arising from the development), and potentially inequitable (necessarily
imposing the burden of new regulation on some proponents but not necessarily capturing others), but they
at least aim to address systemic bias in favour of proponents who have little incentive to try to accurately
predict net impacts, and encourage proponents to estimate impacts at a reasonably high level. Making
requirements like these part of an adaptive screening decision might make them enforceable beyond the
developer and the decision-maker, and hence engage public enforcement.
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that EU law in relation to mitigation measures and screening for EIA is to a
degree uncertain and may be, for wider EU administrative law reasons, be in a state of transition. While
some of this uncertainty is inevitable in the nature of determining significance, and in the sometimes tricky
task of demarcating projects and mitigation measures, there is scope to address the issue differently, either
by changes in screening or, in addition, by follow-throughmeasures. The proposals made here are intended
to address one particular aspect of significance in a flexible, targeted and pragmatic manner.
134B. Karkkainen, “Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 951. See also J. Arts and J. Meijer, “Designing for EIA Follow-up: Experience from The Netherlands” in. A. Morrison-Saunders and J. Arts (eds),
Assessing Impact: Handbook of EIA and SEA Follow-up (Earthscan, 2004).
135 In the way, e.g. that statutory nuisance law works in England and Wales under Pt III Environmental Protection Act 1990.
136 In contrast to the EIA Directive art.10 of the 2001 EU Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive does require follow-up action: “Member
States shall monitor the significant environmental effects of the implementation of plans and programmes in order, inter alia, to identify at an early
stage unforeseen adverse effects, and to be able to undertake appropriate remedial action.” According to the Commission Guidance on the SEA
Directive, however, “Article 10 appears not necessarily to require that significant environmental effects are monitored directly”. The Directive also
allows them to be monitored indirectly through, for example, pressure factors or mitigation measures, see European Commission, Implementation of
Directive 2001/42 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, 8.8 (at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia
/pdf/030923_sea_guidance.pdf [Accessed September 24, 2011]). More fundamentally, art.10 does not actually impose any requirement to take remedial
action.
137Commission v Ireland (C-215/06) [2008] E.C.R. I-4911 at [54]–[60].
138D. Hodas, “NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental Accounting” (2000) 14 Natural Resources and Environment 185.
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